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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to point out a hitherto unnoticed implication
of Scarf’s (1960) seminal work on three commodity economies with a unique un-
stable equilibrium. The instability result of Scarf was illustrated under the CES
family of preferences [see also Hirota (1981, 1985)],
1 but it is also valid under a
quasilinear preference, provided that all consumers choose interior solutions — to
our knowledge, except for Gale’s (1963) example (Giﬀen’s case), similar results
have not been obtained with other types of preferences. Although this result itself
is not surprising in light of the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results which imply
that any continuous function satisfying Walras Law and Homogeneity can be re-
alized as the excess demand functions of some exchange economy, the example
presented here gives explicit conditions under which a Walrasian price adjustment
process fails to converge to an equilibrium. The meaning of the example is thus
twofold: (i) to raise a note of caution when, for example, performing comparative
statics with quasilinear preferences and (ii) to provide an economic foundation for
the instability of competitive equilibrium. That is, quasilinear preferences, widely
used in economics, must be treated carefully in equilibrium analysis (unlike Cobb-
Douglas preferences which exhibit gross substitutability). The ﬁnding might have
practical value, since Anderson et. al (2004) observe that the average transaction
prices in double auction experiments follow the path predicted by the Scarf and
Hirota models. In addition, an interpretation of the example is that it shows insta-
bility in an exchange between three kinds of money [for an exchange between two
kinds of money, see Shapley and Shubik (1977) and also Bergstrom et. al (2009)].
2. Model and Results
Let us consider a class of three commodity economies. The excess demand
functions Zi(p1,p2,p3) : R3
++ → R,i = 1,2,3 are assumed to satisfy the following:




i piZi = 0 (Walras Law),
(A2) ∀i, Zi(αp1,αp2,αp3) = Zi(p1,p2,p3) for any α > 0 (Homogeneity),
(A3) Each Zi is continuously diﬀerentiable (Diﬀerentiability),
(A4) Z2(p1,p2,p3) = Z1(p2,p3,p1) and Z3(p1,p2,p3) = Z2(p2,p3,p1) (Circular-
ity),
(A5) ∂Z1/∂p2 < 0 and ∂Z1/∂p3 > 0.
1To be exact, Scarf oﬀered two examples: one with Leontief type utility functions and the other
with CES utility functions.
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Then, Lemmas 1–3 in Scarf (1960) state that the excess demand functions Zi have
an equilibrium at (1,1,1) and the equilibrium is unique up to a positive scalar
multiple.
The price adjustment process which we consider is as follows:
˙ pi = Zi(p1,p2,p3), p
0
i > 0 i = 1,2, with p3 ≡ 1, (1)
where ˙ pi denotes the time derivative of pi(t) and p0
i = pi(0). The Jacobian matrix






whose eigenvalues are: C ±
√
AB . Since the product AB is negative, the stability
depends on the sign of C; if C is positive, then the equilibrium is locally unstable.
This result is parallel to Lemma 4 of Scarf (1960) for the price adjustment process
on the sphere.
We now consider an exchange economy with commodity space R3 and three
consumers. Suppose that the utility functions and initial endowments are:
consumer1 : { u
1(x1,x2,x3) = v(x1,x2), ω
1 = (b1,0,0) },
consumer2 : { u
2(x1,x2,x3) = v(x2,x3), ω
2 = (0,b2,0) },
consumer3 : { u
3(x1,x2,x3) = v(x3,x1), ω
3 = (0,0,b3) },
where v is the quasilinear utility function on R × R++ deﬁned by v(y1,y2) =
y1 − (1/a)y
−a
2 , a > 0, and bi > 0, i = 1,2,3. For our purpose, we focus on interior
solutions to avoid boundary issues. Consumer i demands positive amounts of both
commodities:
y1 = bi − (pi+1/pi)
a/(1+a), y2 = (pi/pi+1)
1/(1+a) if pi+1/pi < b
(1+a)/a
i , (3)










which clearly satisfy (A1)–(A5).
Consider the process (1) with the functions (4). In what follows, we always
restrict ourselves to the open region E in the (p1,p2)-plane with p3 = 1 containing
the equilibrium (1,1) such that the interiority conditions of (3) are all satisﬁed,
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whose existence is guaranteed for bi > 1, i = 1,2,3; we consider the process on
E = {(p1,p2) ∈ R2
++|∀i,pi+1/pi < b
(1+a)/a
i ,p3 = 1,bi > 1, (i + 1 = 1 for i = 3)}
with (p0
1,p0
2) ∈ E. Then, C in the matrix (2) is: −(1 − a)/(1 + a), which means
that the unique equilibrium (1,1) is locally unstable for a > 1;2 this instability
occurs when each excess demand is an increasing function of its own price at the
equilibrium. Let us note that (i) none of the commodities is inferior and (ii) the
instability is due to weak substitution eﬀects in addition to asymmetrical income
eﬀects.3 In fact, writing the C as the sum of substitution and income terms, one can
verify that the substitution terms tend to zero as a increases. For disequilibrium
dynamics, we have the following results:
Proposition 1. For a = 1, the process has a continuous family of closed orbits
around (1,1).
Proof. 4 Let a = 1. Let us introduce the function on R2
++ deﬁned by H(p1,p2) =
h(p1) + h(p2) where h(y) = 1/6 + (1/2)y2 − (2/3)y3/2. We ﬁnd that along any
solution of the process, ˙ H = 0; consequently H is a ﬁrst integral of the process.
Notice that dh/dy   0 ⇔ y   1. This implies that H has a global minimum at
(1,1), H(1,1) = 0, and is not constant on any open set. Then, we can take a region
R ⊂ E bounded by a closed level curve of H, i.e., R = {(p1,p2) ∈ R2
++|H(p1,p2) ≦
k,0 < k < 1/6}, and conclude, by Theorem 3 in Hirsch and Smale (1974, p. 252),
that there is no limit cycle in R. Moreover, R is compact and invariant, and hence
the ω-limit set of any initial point in R is nonempty and compact. Thus, by the
Poincar´ e-Bendixson Theorem [c.f. Hirsch and Smale (1974, p. 248)], if the ω-limit
set does not contain an equilibrium, i.e., (1,1), then it is a closed orbit. Consider
an arbitrary initial point (p0
1,p0
2) ∈ R \ {(1,1)}. Since H(p0
1,p0
2) > 0 and H is
constant along every solution, the equilibrium (1,1) cannot be in the ω-limit set of
the point (p0
1,p0
2); therefore the ω-limit set must be a closed orbit. This, together
with the nonexistence of limit cycles, ﬁnishes the proof.  
Proposition 2. For a > 1, the process has no closed orbit.
2It is known that if there is a unique, locally completely unstable equilibrium (all eigenvalues
have positive real values) in a regular economy, then the number of commodities is odd [Dierker
(1974, Sec. 11)]. However, our example can not be seen as a direct application of the result, since
we adopt the num´ eraire normalization and have the interiority conditions.
3We have stability if we neglect asymmetrical income eﬀects. See Arrow and Hurwicz (1958) and
Arrow and Hahn (1971, Sec. 12.5).
4This proof is inspired by Flaschel’s (1984) proof of the closed-orbit structure of Goodwin’s
growth cycle model.
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Proof. Let a > 1. Let us introduce the function on R2
++ deﬁned by W(p1,p2) =






1)1/(1+a)], which is positive. It then follows, by Dulac’s
Criterion [c.f. Andronov et. al (1966, p. 305)], that there can be no closed orbit.  
We can also characterize the type of the equilibrium (1,1): a < 1 stable
focus (i.e., solutions near it spiral toward it); a = 1 center (i.e., solutions near
it are periodic); a > 1 unstable focus (i.e., solutions near it spiral away from it).
Finally, it should be remarked that the price dynamics of our example is similar to
that of the perturbed Scarf example in Mukherji (2007). The mechanisms of loss of
stability are diﬀerent, however. In the latter environment there are no substitution
eﬀects and the loss of stability occurs as the initial endowment of one commodity
increases, whereas our instability arises as the parameter in the utility function
increases and it is attributed to weak substitution eﬀects as well as asymmetrical
income eﬀects.
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